Borneo, Counter-Insurgency and War Termination.

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    • Subject Terms:
      INDONESIA; BORNEO; UNITED Kingdom; COMMONWEALTH countries
    • Abstract:
      Using British and Commonwealth operations in Borneo from 1963–1966 as a case study, this article evaluates the impact of grand strategy on the successful prosecution of counter-insurgency operations. Self-evidently, tactical and operational level success is as desirable in counter-insurgency operations as it is in any other military activity. As with other military activities, however, military success should not be confused with victory more generally. In this respect, ‘successful’ war termination requires more than effective tactical and operational principles: the foundation of effective war termination lies with having an appropriate grand strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
    • Abstract:
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