Targeting the centre and (least) poor: Evidence from urban Lahore, Pakistan.

Using the case of Pakistan, this article explores the distribution and politics of public goods provision in urban slums. Across slums, we find that public goods are mainly provided to households located in central slums rather than those in the urban periphery. Within slums, we find politicians target spending towards wealthy households but do not go through brokers, unlike the more-studied case of India. Overall, the article shows how electoral incentives in Pakistan are biased against programmatic public goods provision for the urban poor. Our results then point to variation in patronage politics among slums in the Global South. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

本文以巴基斯坦为例，探讨了城市贫民窟公共品供给的分配与政治。我们发现公共品主要提供给位于城市中心的，而不是城市边缘的贫民窟的家庭。我们还发现政客们往往把支出用于贫民窟中的富裕家庭，但不通过中间人，这与研究更多的印度案例不同。总体而言，本文阐释了巴基斯坦的选举激励措施如何不利于按计划为城市贫民提供公共品。我们的研究结果指出了全球南方贫民窟中恩惠政治的差异。 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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