Poor Institutional Governance: The Bane of Managing Ghana's Oil Revenue.

Ghana discovered crude oil in 2007 and started oil production in 2010. Ghana, consequently, enacted the Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA) to regulate the oil revenue and ensure the optimal utilisation of the oil revenue. To this end, several state institutions have been assigned duties under the PRMA. Quality institutions aid the management of resource revenue. Ghana's constitutional architecture permits a new President to appoint new heads of state institutions. To this end, state institutions meant to serve as a check on executive authority have been found wanting. This article investigates the quality of state institutions with responsibilities under the PRMA concerning their functions to ascertain whether they possess the characteristics of strong institutions. The article argues that executive influence dominates Ghana's PRMA, leading to the institutions making decisions based on political expediency. This shows weak institutional structures. This article argues for the development of state institutions to serve as a check on the executive power. The article thus recommends constitutional amendment regarding the power of appointment of heads of state institutions to be vested in the President and the Public Services Commission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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