PLANNING DECEPTION AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR.

Deception has long been an essential component of military operations. It can be considered a tactic as old as warfare, having been used since immemorial times. From Sun Tzu’s “Art of War” to the present days, military strategists have recognized its power to turn the tide of conflict. Although, over the years, the methods, means and techniques specific to it have continuously evolved, along with technological developments, its basic principle remains the same: portraying a false reality to the adversary that leads to the materialization of operational opportunities, by causing the adversary to adopt courses of action disadvantageous to him. As the battlefield has become increasingly complex, the ability to deceive the adversary has also become an increasingly important asset to the success of military operations. Today, in an era of instant and abundant information, deception has paradoxically become more difficult to achieve and more critical to operational success. The deceptive action of the Ukrainians at Kherson last September against the Russians once again demonstrated its importance on the modern battlefield. However, many military planners tend to overlook this key aspect of military strategy despite its importance. This oversight can lead to grave consequences in the modern battlefield, where the enemy’s ability to gather intelligence can hinder operational success. For this reason, the present paper is an analysis of how deception actions can be integrated into the operational planning process at the operational level in order to maximize the chances of their success and, consequently, the military operation success. The need for such a scientific approach arises from the complexity of the deception process, which places a special emphasis not only on the thoroughness in planning these actions but also on the need to integrate and synchronize them with other military actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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