Inside and Outside a Possible World.

Consider the following argument, where ' ⟨ p ⟩ ' abbreviates 'the proposition that p': It is possible that Socrates does not exist. Necessarily, if Socrates does not exist, then ⟨ Socrates does not exist ⟩ is true. Necessarily, if ⟨ Socrates does not exist ⟩ is true, then ⟨ Socrates does not exist ⟩ exists. Necessarily, if ⟨ Socrates does not exist ⟩ exists, then Socrates exists. Therefore, it is possible that Socrates exists and does not exist. How can one respond to this argument? Fine (1985) thinks that the argument involves an equivocation concerning the notion of truth for propositions: if we stand inside a possible world to evaluate the truth, in this 'inner' sense (3) holds but (2) fails; but if we stand outside, in this 'outer' sense (2) holds but (3) fails. In this paper we argue that such an equivocation response is obscure, ad hoc, and unmotivated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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