نسبتِ نِقش اِرزشِهای غِیرمعرفتی وِ نِقش شِواهد دِر نِظریهِهای عِلمیِ. (Persian)

The relationship between the role of non-epistemic values and the role of evidence in scientific theories. (English)

The Value-Free Ideal of science (VFI) is the view that non-epistemic values can play no legitimate role in the epistemic evaluation of scientific theories. The VFI, which once was defended as a regulative norm guiding the course of scientific inquiry in dealing with non-epistemic values, has been the target of some forceful attacks lately. One of the main objections is an argument called the Inductive Risk Argument (IRA). The validity of IRA, though, has been questioned. Moreover, it can be shown that even if we assume its validity, IRA is not successful in routing out the VFI. The core idea behind the VFI is the illegitimacy of any role non-cognitive values may play in determining the evidence, so to undermine the VFI, this very claim should be denied. Accordingly, there have been attempts in the literature to point out cases of the proper evidential role of non-cognitive values. By examining these cases, we argue that nonepistemic values should not play any evidential role for scientific theories, and thus the VFI can be defended. In the end, a more accurate interpretation of the VFI will be provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Metaphysics / Metaphysik is the property of University of Isfahan and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)