Do regional governments fulfill fewer election promises than national governments? The case of Quebec in comparative perspective.

This article analyzes for the first time the fulfillment of election pledges at the regional level using data from Quebec. We theorize that pledge fulfillment by regional governments is subject to adverse effects that do not normally operate at the national level. In line with expectations, we find that regional parties in Quebec fulfill smaller percentages of campaign pledges than their federal counterparts. We identify two main causal explanations for this. The sharing of resources (jurisdictions, power, and money) with the federal government prevents provincial parties from fulfilling some pledges, and it creates jurisdictional rivalries with the federal government that lead regional parties, nationalist parties in particular, to over-pledge. In conclusion, we argue that the results from Quebec can be generalized to other regional governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Party Politics is the property of Sage Publications, Ltd. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)