'Special Concern'? A Mixed-Methods Examination of the Tension between Legal and Practical Conceptions of Academic Freedom

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Academic Freedom; Federal Legislation; Courts; Constitutional Law; Guidance; College Faculty; Teacher Attitudes; Organizational Culture; Political Attitudes; Governance; Peer Relationship; Teacher Administrator Relationship; Definitions; Freedom of Speech

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Academic freedom is an oft-invoked buzzword in debates about campus speech and the American university. But how have courts treated legal disputes where faculty members have invoked academic freedom as a potential constitutional interest? And how do faculty themselves conceptualize academic freedom? The similarities and differences between these two approaches to academic freedom are critical in a political and social climate where universities are a site of contestation. To examine these questions, this dissertation used a mixed-methods approach to academic freedom, drawing from both legal and social science research methods. The legal analysis found that federal courts have been inconsistent in how they consider academic freedom. Though the U.S. Supreme Court has spoken of academic freedom as a "special concern of the First Amendment," the Court has failed to definitively articulate whether academic freedom has constitutional protection. Lacking guidance, lower federal courts have applied academic freedom in contradictory ways. A survey of future university faculty members showed support for academic freedom in a variety of university contexts. Respondents also expressed concern that a lack of academic freedom has a chilling effect on university faculty. However, attitudes about academic freedom were tempered by politics--both in the partisan identity of the respondent and in the political content of a hypothetical professor's speech. Ultimately, this dissertation suggests that legal and professorial conceptions of academic freedom have multiple important differences. While courts have been reluctant to extend academic freedom protections to faculty governance, respondents felt that academic freedom was necessary in their interactions with colleagues and administrators. Conversely, while federal jurisprudence has held that public employee speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern is generally protected by the First Amendment, respondents were less likely to speak as citizens due to concerns about a lack of academic freedom. By blurring definitional boundaries, these differences may undercut the use of academic freedom as a primary justification for the protection of professorial speech. This dissertation concludes by emphasizing the limited nature of constitutional protection for academic freedom before offering avenues for future research. [The dissertation citations contained here are published with the permission of ProQuest LLC. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission. Copies of dissertations may be obtained by Telephone (800) 1-800-521-0600. Web page: http://www.proquest.com/en-US/products/dissertations/individuals.shtml.]

As Provided

2024

ED659875